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Abstract— We study a setting in which a principal selects an
agent to execute a collection of tasks according to a specified
priority sequence. Agents, however, have their own individual
priority sequences according to which they wish to execute
the tasks. There is information asymmetry since each priority
sequence is private knowledge for the individual agent. We
design a mechanism for selecting the agent and incentivizing
the selected agent to realize a priority sequence for executing
the tasks that achieves socially optimal performance. Our
proposed mechanism consists of two parts. First, the principal
runs an auction to select an agent to allocate tasks to with
minimum declared priority sequence misalignment. Then, the
principal rewards the agent according to the realized priority
sequence with which the tasks were performed. We show that
the proposed mechanism is individually rational and incentive
compatible. Further, it is also socially optimal for the case of
linear cost of priority sequence modification for the agents.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a situation in which a system operator must
hire one among several agents to execute some tasks. The
operator has a quality of service (QoS) constraint that implies
a desired order in which the tasks should be executed.
The agents, however, may prioritize tasks execution in a
different order depending on their own private preferences
and shifting their preferred order of execution may impose
a cost on the agents. Such misalignment of the preferred
order of execution among the principal and the agents,
especially with information asymmetry, creates performance
inefficiency from the principal’s viewpoint. Minimizing this
inefficiency requires the principal to devise an appropriate
mechanism to select an agent and incentivize him to shift
his preferred priority order for executing the tasks.
Such a formulation is relevant to many situations. For
instance, in a cloud computing application, users request a
Cloud Computing Service Provider (CCSP) to perform a job.
The CCSP then allocates the tasks among the servers. If
tasks come in at a high rate and the number of servers is
limited, the tasks may form a task queue [1]–[4]. In this
case, the CCSP may have a preferred order in which the
tasks are executed based on QoS guarantees it has promised
to the users. However, if the servers are independent entities
providing service for a fee, they may follow a different order
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of performing the tasks. This misalignment can cause the
CCSP to violate the QoS guarantees it has promised, and
hence, degrade system performance.
As another instance, employees of an organization may
perform tasks (such as responding to emails in technical
support) that are assigned to them in a different order than
the one that is desired by the organization. Since the rate
at which humans can respond to emails is limited, emails
pile up [5], [6]. People generally do not respond to emails
in the received order, but act on them based their own
priorities [7]–[10] which may be based on factors that are
both intrinsic (e.g., interest, curiosity, or information gaps)
and extrinsic, (e.g., incentives provided by the organization).
Thus, a similar problem as we consider arises in which the
organization must incentivize employees to respond to tasks
according to the order preferred by the organization.
In this paper, we model the problem as one of designing
a contract through which the principal (the system operator)
asks the agents about their private priorities and incentivizes
them to shift their priorities in a way that is socially optimal.
Specifically, since the agents incur a cost to change their
priorities from their private ones, the principal needs to
provide enough incentives so that rational agents will shift
their priorities to align with those of the principal. For
simplicity, in this work, we assume that only one agent is
selected to execute all the tasks. The primary challenge in
the design of the contract arises from the hidden nature of
the priorities of the agents who are free to misreport them.
Thus, a simple compensation scheme based on self-reported
priority will not be sufficient as the agents can misreport the
baseline or the private priorities. The private nature of the
individual priorities at the agents causes adverse selection
and also leads to the effort put in by the agents to change
from the initial preferred priority to the realized one to also
be hidden. In other words, there is the problem of both
hidden information and hidden action for the principal [11,
Chapter 14C], [11, Chapter 14B]. Further, the principal can
observe the priority realized by only the selected agent. Our
goal is to design a contract which resolves these issues and
incentivizes the agents to put in sufficient effort to realize a
priority that optimizes the social welfare.
Our solution relies on formulating this problem as a two-
stage contract design problem. In the first stage, the principal
selects the agent to whom to allocate the tasks using the
priorities self-reported by the agents. In the second stage, the
principal compensates the selected agent using the priority
he realizes in a way that leads to social optimality. We
propose a VCG-based mechanism for the first stage in which
the agents announce their private priorities to the principal
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and the principal selects the agent to assign the tasks. We
show that the first stage limits misreporting by the agents. In
the second stage, we design a compensation scheme using
the observable realized priority by the selected agent and
the initially declared priorities. In this two-stage design, the
agents bid (possibly falsified) priorities in the first stage
and the selected agent optimizes the realized priority for
performing the tasks in the second stage. The principal
designs the auction in the first stage and the compensation
in the second step.
The model considered herein is inspired by [12], which
presents a queueing-theoretic study of the problem. However,
unlike [12], we do not consider the realized priority as a
given and fixed function of the priority of the principal
and interests of the agent, but as a design parameter for
the agent to maximize his own utility. Although there is
a vast literature on multi-agent task scheduling literature
(see, e.g., [13]–[15]), prior work does not consider either
information asymmetry between the agents and the principal
or the design of incentives. To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the first work to adopt a game-theoretic approach
to analyzing priority misalignments between task senders
and task receivers. In the mechanism design literature, VCG
mechanisms have long been used for incentive design in
the case of hidden information between the principal and
the agents. In particular, VCG mechanisms are used to
incentivize agents to reveal their true private information
and to guarantee the efficient (socially optimal) outcome
in dominant strategies [11, Chapter 23], [16, Chapter 5].
However, a VCG-based mechanism is effective only for
the first stage of our problem when we select the agent to
perform the tasks and its interaction with the second stage
which features compensation for the hidden effort put in by
the agent to align his priority with the principal is a priori
unclear.
Our main contribution is developing a game-theoretic
approach to the problem of task allocation and priority
realization when there is information asymmetry and pos-
sibility of misreporting private information by the agents.
The problem features both hidden information and hidden
action, and is significantly different than problems of pure
adverse selection or pure moral hazard. We propose a VCG-
based mechanism followed by an incentivization method for
the problem. We show that under the proposed scheme, the
agents act truthfully in reporting their preferred priorities
in a dominant strategy manner. In addition, the principal
can achieve the socially optimal outcome, as well guarantee
individual rationality and incentive compatibility, through the
proposed mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the problem statement and some preliminaries. Sec-
tion III proposes and analyzes our incentive mechanism for
the principal-agent queuing problem. Section IV concludes
by presenting potential directions for future work.
Fig. 1. Timeline of the interaction between the principal and the agent.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a group of N + 1 decision makers. Decision
maker 0 is the principal, who is interested in performing
a sequence of tasks with a particular priority. Decision
makers 1, . . . ,N are agents with their own private priorities
for performing the tasks. The principal must incentivize the
agents to perform the tasks in the desired order.
A. Model
The principal seeks to delegate M tasks, denoted by k =
1, . . . ,M, to a group of self-interested agents, denoted by
i = 1, . . . ,N. All the decision makers have an associated
priority with which they wish to execute the tasks. Let
X = [x1, . . . ,xM] denote the priority of the principal where
xk is the priority for executing the kth task. Similarly, let
Yi = [yi1, . . . ,yiM] denote the priority for the ith agent, where
yik is the priority of the ith agent for fulfilling the kth task.
The vector X is public knowledge while the vector Yi is
private knowledge to the ith decision maker.
Remark 1: Note that in this paper, we assume that priority
vectors are metric data and not ordinal data.
The principal selects one agent and incentivizes him to
execute the tasks in an order as close to X as possible. Given
the incentive, if the ith agent is selected to execute the tasks,
let Zi be the realized priority of execution. Further, denote
by h(Yi,Zi) the effort cost for the agent to change his priority
from Yi to Zi. In other words, when the agent with priority
Yi is selected, and he performs the tasks with priority Zi, he
incurs the cost h(Yi,Zi).
If agent i is selected, Zi is observable to the principal. In
other words, the principal can observe the order in which the
tasks were actually executed. Contrarily, if i is not selected,
neither Yi nor Zi is observable for that agent, since the agent
is not assigned any task to realize the priority Zi.
Note that since the principal does not have access to
the priorities Yi’s of the agents, these variables are not
contractible. In fact, if the principal inquires about the vectors
Yi’s, the agents can misreport them as Y ′i ’s to try and exploit
the incentive mechanism to gain more benefit.
B. Problem Formulation
Figure 1 demonstrates the timeline of the problem. The
principal receives the (possibly false) reported priorities
{Y ′i } and chooses an agent w based on an as yet unde-
termined mechanism. The principal then observes the real-
ized priority Zw and pays every agent i payment equal to
Pi(X ,Y ′1, . . . ,Y
′
N ,Zw). The mechanism to choose the agent w
as well as the payment are committed ex ante. Note that
the priority modification to Zw by the agent enhances the
performance of the organization and leads to profit S(X ,Zw)
for the principal.
Remark 2: In this paper, we assume an indivisible array
of tasks that must all be executed by one agent. Optimally
allocating tasks to multiple agents is a significantly harder
problem that is left for future work.
Remark 3: The choice of the agent to execute the tasks
is a challenging problem since the payment function is
committed ex ante.
The utilities of the various decision makers are as follows.
Suppose that agent w is selected to execute the tasks. Then,
the utility Ui of the ith agent is given by
Ui =
{
Pi(X ,Y ′1, . . . ,Y
′
N ,Zw)−h(Yw,Zw) i= w
Pi(X ,Y ′1, . . . ,Y
′
N ,Zw) i 6= w.
(1)
The utility of the principal can be written as
V = S(X ,Zw)−
N
∑
i=1
Pi(X ,Y ′1, . . . ,Y
′
N ,Zw). (2)
We are interested, in particular, in mechanisms that are
socially optimal (or, in other words, efficient). An incentive
mechanism is socially optimal if the decision makers choose
to realize an outcome that maximizes the social welfare given
by
Π=V +
N
∑
i=1
Ui.
The problem faced by each agent is to optimize the choice
of reported priority Y ′i , and if chosen to perform the tasks
the choice of realized priority Zi, to maximize his utility
(subject to the principal’s choices). The problem faced by
the principal is to choose the agent w to execute the tasks
and to design the payment Pi(X ,Y ′1, · · · ,Y ′N ,Zw) to optimize
the social welfare (subject to the choices of the agents). Thus,
the problem we are interested in can be written as
P1 :

{w,Pi}= argmaxΠ
subject to Y ′∗i = argmax Ui, ∀i 6= w,
{Y ′∗w , Z∗w}= argmax Uw
additional constraints
. (3)
We consider the following two additional constraints
in P1.
(i) Individual Rationality (IR): Individual rationality or
participation constraint implies that under the incentive
mechanism
V ≥ 0, Ui ≥ 0 for all i .
Informally, the principal and the agents, acting ratio-
nally, prefer to participate in the proposed contract
rather than opting out. This constraint limits the space
of contracts by, e.g., precluding contracts based only
on penalties.
(ii) Incentive Compatibility (IC): A payment or a contract
is incentive compatible if the agents submit their hid-
den information truthfully if asked. Specifically, this
constraint implies that the utility of an agent does not
increase if they report Y ′i 6= Yi; or, in other words, for
any i
Ui(Y1, . . . ,Yi−1,Y ′i ,Yi+1, . . . ,YN)
≤Ui(Y1, . . . ,Yi−1,Yi,Yi+1, . . . ,YN) .
Assumption 1: For simplicity, we define the misalignment
between two priority vectors Λ and Γ as a scalar function
m(Λ,Γ) of the two vectors. The function m(·, ·) can, for
instance, be the norm of the difference of the two vectors.
We assume that both the effort cost h(Yi,Zi) and the profit
S(X ,Zi) are functions of the misalignment m(Yi,Zi) and
m(X ,Zi) respectively. In addition, we define
θi = m(X ,Yi), γi = m(X ,Zi), θ ′i = m(X ,Y
′
i ),
where θi and γi denote the initial priority misalignment and
the realized priority misalignment between the agent i and
the principal respectively. Further, θ ′i corresponds to priority
misalignment declared by the agent initially. In the sequel,
we abuse the notation and denote the effort cost as h(θi,γi)
and the profit of the principal as S(γi).
We make the following two further assumptions.
Assumption 2: If agent i is selected, the realized priority
misalignment by the agent is always less than the initial
priority misalignment, i.e., γi ≤ θi. In other words, the
agent does not gain any benefit by increasing his priority
misalignment with the principal.
Given this assumption, the principal can restrict the falsifi-
cation by the agents in reporting their priorities through an
appropriate payment function. Note that θi is unobservable
to the principal even if agent i is selected to execute the
tasks. Thus, the principal must rely on θ ′i instead for the
payment scheme. However, the principal may pay an agent
only if γi ≤ θ ′i to restrict the falsification by the agent. We
assume that such a payment scheme is used and the following
behavior is followed by the agents.
Assumption 3: The agent i, if selected, chooses γi and θ ′i
such that γi ≤ θ ′i .
III. MAIN RESULTS
We propose a two-step mechanism in which first an agent
is selected to execute the tasks through an auction mechanism
and then payments are made according to the reported
and realized priorities. Note that the hidden nature of the
preferred priorities and the effort cost creates the problem
of hidden information (adverse selection) in the first stage
and then the problem of hidden action (moral hazard) in the
second stage. The constraints of individual rationality and
incentive compatibility significantly constrain the design of
each of these steps. For instance, at the first stage, an auction
which asks the agents to report their priorities and chooses
the agents with the least reported priority misalignment will
not be incentive compatible since it provides an opportunity
for the agents to announce a priority close to that of the
principal to be selected.
Similarly, consider a payment scheme in which the agent
w that is selected to execute the tasks which depends merely
on the reported misalignment θ ′w regardless of the realized
priority Zw (or equivalently γw) and ignores the effort cost.
Given θw, this payment limits the range of realized priority
such that
h(θw,γw)≤ p(θ ′w) .
There is no a priori guarantee that the resulting priority
vector Zw will be socially optimal. On the other hand, a
payment that is merely a function of the realized priority
γw and ignores the self-reported priorities may also be too
restrictive. In particular, individual rationality will once again
constrain Zw (or equivalently γw) so that given θw,
h(θw,γw)≤ p(γw) .
Finally, we note that even if the payment depends on
both θ ′w and γw to account for the effort cost properly and
satisfy individual rationality, the payment still needs to be
carefully designed to ensure incentive compatibility. Thus,
a payment function p(θ ′w,γw) that depends on the level
of effort cost that the agent claims that he incurred for
priority modification provides the opportunity for the agents
to behave strategically. For instance, under such a payment, a
strategic agent may choose not to exert any effort and choose
γw = θw, θ ′w = argmax p(θ
′
w,γw) .
Thus, this payment is not incentive compatible since although
the strategic agent does not change his priority, he obtains a
non-zero payment.
A. Proposed Mechanism
We now propose a two-step mechanism which attains the
desired properties of individual rationality, incentive com-
patibility, and under further assumptions, social optimality.
This mechanism first selects an agent to execute the tasks
and then compensates him.
Recall from Figure 1, that the timeline of the problem is
as follows:
1) The agents are asked to submit their preferred priority
vectors Yi’s (equivalently, the variables θi’s). However,
they can misreport the vectors as Y ′i ’s (equivalently as
θ ′i ’s).
2) The principal chooses an agent as the winner of the
auction. Assume that the agent with index w is the
winner. Agent w is expected to execute the tasks in the
next stage.
3) Agent w performs the task with a realized priority Zw.
In other words, it chooses the variable γw and incurs the
corresponding effort cost.
4) The agent w receives a payment.
We now present our proposed mechanism M .
(i) The principal chooses the agent w to execute all the
tasks such that w= argmin{θ ′i }Ni=1.
(ii) The payment to agent w is chosen as a func-
tion of γw and the second lowest bid θ¯ =
min{θ ′1, · · · ,θ ′w−1,θ ′w+1, · · · ,θ ′N}. Specifically, we con-
sider a payment Pw(θ¯ ,γw) to agent w which satisfies
two properties:
∀γw, if θw ≥ θ¯ , we have Pw(θ¯ , γw)≤ h(θw, γw)
∃γw s.t. if θw < θ¯ , we have Pw(θ¯ , γw)> h(θw, γw)
.
(4)
(iii) All other agents i 6= w are not paid.
Remark 4: Note the condition in (4) is essential for in-
ducing incentive compatibility. An example of a payment
scheme which satisfies this condition for the cost function
h(θw, γw) = θw− γw is of the form Pw(θ¯ , γw) = θ¯ − γw.
Under the proposed mechanism, the utilities of the agents
are given by
Ui =
{
Pi(θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi) i= w
0 i 6= w , (5)
while the utility of the principal and the social welfare can
be written as
V = S(γw)−Pw(θ¯ , γw), Π= S(γw)−h(θw, γw) . (6)
The following result shows that the proposed mechanism
is incentive compatibile and individually rational.
Theorem 1: Consider the problem P1. The proposed
mechanism M is incentive compatible, i.e., every agent i
reports θ ′i = θi. Further, it satisfies the individual rationality
constraint.
Proof: See Appendix.
Remark 5: The proposed mechanism resembles the cele-
brated VCG mechanism in the way it selects w and in the
structure of the proposed payment. However, beyond the fact
that the payment depends on the additional parameter γw,
note that the standard solution of offering a payment of the
form S(γw)−Π?, where Π? denotes the the value of the
social welfare under the socially optimal outcome, will not
result in the agent w realizing the socially optimal outcome
in our case. This payment violates (4) and therefore violates
incentive compatibility constraint.
Although social optimality is difficult to achieve for a
general form of the effort cost, it can be achieved for the
case of linear effort cost, i.e., when h(θi, γi) = |θi− γi|.
Theorem 2: Consider the problem P1 with the mecha-
nism M . If the effort cost is linear and the payment is
chosen to be of the form Pw = θ¯ − γw, then M solves P1.
Specifically, the mechanism
(i) guarantees truth-telling by the agents , i.e., θ ′i = θi, in
(weakly) dominant strategy,
(ii) realizes the socially optimal outcome, and
(iii) is individually rational.
Proof: See Appendix.
B. Discussion
The problem that we consider is challenging primarily
because it exhibits both hidden information and hidden effort
on the part of the agents without any recourse to verification.
The combination of adverse selection and moral hazard
creates a possibility of rich strategic behavior by the agents.
We need to design both an auction and a compensation
scheme. If the problem were of either auction design or
compensation design alone, a rather standard mechanism
can solve the problem. Specifically, for auction design when
our focus is on a problem of adverse selection, we can
achieve incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and
social optimality by the VCG mechanism. Similarly, for
compensation design to counteract pure moral hazard, social
optimality and individual rationality can be realized through
the standard contract of the form discussed in Remark 5.
However, our problem features both adverse selection and
moral hazard, and thus requires an auction followed by
compensation for priority alignment. In this case, strategic
agents can exploit the information asymmetry to degrade the
efficiency of the outcome under either of the standard solu-
tions for auction design or compensation for moral hazard
alone. In other words, we can not achieve both incentive
compatibility and social optimality. This result is similar
in spirit to the so-called price of anarchy which captures
the inefficiency in a system as a result of selfish/strategic
behavior of the agents.
The surprising result in Theorem 2 is that for a specific
effort cost, we are able to realize all three properties of
individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and social op-
timality even in this challenging setup. That this is possible
was not a priori obvious, and it would be interesting to
identify further properties, such as budget balance, that may
be achievable. Impossibility results such as [17], [18] may
seem contradictory to the goal of obtaining an efficient, indi-
vidually rational, budget-balanced mechanism. It should be
noted, however, that we are restricting attention to a specific
class of valuation functions that are different from those
studied in these results; hence, the existing impossibility
results may not hold anymore. Studying the existence of such
behavior will be left as a future direction.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of contract design
between a system operator and a group of agents that each
have a desired sequence of performing a collection of tasks.
Since the priority orders for the agents is private information
for them and these orders may not align with that of the prin-
cipal, there is information asymmetry. The principal selects
one of the agents to execute the tasks and wishes to realize
the socially optimal outcome. The problem is to design a
mechanism for selecting the agent to execute the tasks and
to compensate him to minimize the misalignment of the
realized priority with the one that is socially optimal. The
problem features both moral hazard and adverse selection.
We proposed a two-stage mechanism including a VCG-like
mechanism for task allocation followed by a compensation
mechanism. We showed that the mechanism is individually
rational, incentive compatible, and for linear effort costs,
socially optimal.
Future work will consider the more general case where
there are divisible tasks so that multiple agents need to be
selected [12], [19]. This problem adds task-scheduling to the
mechanism design; in other words, the principal must solve
a resource allocation problem followed by compensation
design. Other directions include considering the possibility
of designing a mechanism that is also budget balanced in
addition to being individually rational, incentive compatible,
and socially optimal.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Given an arbitrary agent i, its hidden priority θi, and the
reported priority misalignment of the other players, we need
to show that utility of agent i is maximized by setting θ ′i = θi.
Note also that θ¯ denotes the lowest priority misalignment
reported by the other agents. If θi > θ¯ , then agent i loses
and receives utility 0. If θi ≤ θ¯ , then agent i wins the tasks
and receives utility Pi( θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi) for performance of
task.
We consider two cases. First, if θi > θ¯ , the highest utility
that agent i can gain for any value of γi is given by
max{0,Pi( θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi)} .
According to (4), we can obtain that
max{0,Pi( θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi)}= 0 .
Thus, agent i can achieve this utility by bidding his priority
truthfully (and losing the auction). Second, if θi ≤ θ¯ , the
highest utility that agent i can gain according to our mech-
anism is
max{0,Pi( θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi)}= Pi( θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi),
and agent i can achieve this utility by bidding his priority
truthfully and winning the auction. Note that the utility of
the agent for each case is always non-negative and therefore
the mechanism satisfies individual rationality constraint.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
First notice that according to Assumption 2, we can write
the effort cost as h(θi, γi) = θi− γi.
(i) We first prove that the proposed mechanism design
induces truth-telling as a dominant strategy, i.e., it is
incentive compatible. Similar to the proof of Theorem
1, we consider two cases. First, if θi > θ¯ , the highest
utility that agent i can get is
max{0,Pi(θ¯ , γi)−h(θi, γi)} .
Given Pi(θ¯ , γi) = θ¯ − γi and h(θi, γi) = θi − γi, the
highest utility that agent i can get if θi > θ¯ is
max{0, θ¯ − γi− (θi− γi)}= {0, θ¯ −θi}= 0 , (7)
and agent i gains this utility by bidding truthfully and
losing the auction. Second, if θi ≤ θ¯ , the highest utility
that agent i can get is
max{0, θ¯ − γi− (θi− γi)}= θ¯ −θi , (8)
and agent i gains this utility by bidding his priority
truthfully and winning the auction. Note that another
approach to check incentive compatibility of Pi is to
see that Pi satisfies (4).
(ii) Next, we show that the agents realizes γ?w through this
payment. The socially optimal outcome is obtained as
γ?w = argmaxS(γw)−h(θw, γw) .
On the other hand, given (7) and (8), the utilities of the
agents are given by
Ui(θi, θ¯) =
{
θ¯ −θi, i= w
0, i 6= w , (9)
which does not depend on the value of γi. Thus, the
agent is indifferent among his realized priorities and
we conclude that the agents realize the socially optimal
outcome γ?w.
(iii) Note that the utility of the agent in (9) for each
case is always non-negative and therefore the proposed
mechanism satisfies individual rationality constraint.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Cao, K. Hwang, K. Li, and A. Y. Zomaya, “Optimal multiserver
configuration for profit maximization in cloud computing,” IEEE
Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst., vol. 24, no. 6, pp. 1087–1096, Jun. 2013.
[2] M. Armbrust, A. Fox, R. Griffith, A. D. Joseph, R. Katz, A. Konwin-
ski, G. Lee, D. Patterson, A. Rabkin, I. Stoica, and M. Zaharia, “A
view of cloud computing,” Commun. ACM, vol. 53, no. 4, pp. 50–58,
Apr. 2010.
[3] R. Pedarsani, J. Walrand, and Y. Zhong, “Scheduling tasks with
precedence constraints on multiple servers,” in Proc. 52nd Annu.
Allerton Conf. Commun. Control Comput., Oct. 2014, pp. 1196–1203.
[4] A. Ansaripour and T. B. Trafalis, “A robust multicriteria optimization
model for city logistic terminal locations,” in IIE Annual Conference.
Proceedings. Institute of Industrial and Systems Engineers (IISE),
2013, p. 2801.
[5] D. Kahneman, Attention and Effort. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1973.
[6] J. B. Spira, Overload!: How Too Much Information is Hazardous to
your Organization. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
[7] L. A. Dabbish, R. E. Kraut, S. Fussell, and S. Kiesler, “Understanding
email use: Predicting action on a message,” in Proc. SIGCHI Conf.
Hum. Factors Comput. Syst. (CHI 2005), Apr. 2005, pp. 691–700.
[8] M. Gagné and E. L. Deci, “Self-determination and work motivation,”
J. Org. Behav., vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 331–362, Jun. 2005.
[9] A. M. Isen and J. Reeve, “The influence of positive affect on intrinsic
and extrinsic motivation: Facilitating enjoyment of play, responsible
work behavior, and self-control,” Motiv. Emot., vol. 29, no. 4, pp.
295–323, Dec. 2005.
[10] J. Wainer, L. Dabbish, and R. Kraut, “Should I open this email?: Inbox-
level cues, curiosity and attention to email,” in Proc. 2011 Annu. Conf.
Hum. Factors Comput. Syst. (CHI 2011), May 2011, pp. 3439–3448.
[11] A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green, Microeconomic
Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
[12] A. Sharma, K. Jagannathan, and L. R. Varshney, “Queuing approaches
to principal-agent communication under information overload,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 63, no. 9, pp. 6041–6058,
2017.
[13] A. Ananth and K. C. Sekaran, “Game theoretic approaches for job
scheduling in cloud computing: A survey,” in Proc. 2014 Int. Conf.
Comput. Commun. Technol. (ICCCT), Sep. 2014, pp. 79–85.
[14] J. Bredin, R. T. Maheswaran, Ç. Imer, T. Bas¸ar, D. Kotz, and D. Rus,
“A game-theoretic formulation of multi-agent resource allocation,” in
Proc. 4th Int. Conf. Auton. Agents, Jun. 2000, pp. 349–356.
[15] H. El-Rewini, T. G. Lewis, and H. H. Ali, Task Scheduling in Parallel
and Distributed Systems. Prentice Hall, 1994.
[16] V. Krishna, Auction Theory. Academic Press, 2009.
[17] R. B. Myerson, “Mechanism design by an informed principal,” Econo-
metrica, vol. 51, no. 6, pp. 1767–1797, Nov. 1983.
[18] J. Green and J.-J. Laffont, “On coalition incentive compatibility,” Rev.
Econ. Stud., vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 243–254, Apr. 1979.
[19] A. Chatterjee, L. R. Varshney, and S. Vishwananth, “Work capacity
of freelance markets: Fundamental limits and decentralized schemes,”
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, to appear, 2017.
